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Site Visit Notes

Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi

...
October 20 to November 17, 1994
• • •

By Jeff Drumtra, Africa Policy Analyst
U.S. Committee for Refugees

The purpose of these "Site Visit Notes" is to provide timely information, analysis, and
recommendations to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), U.S. policy makers, and to UN and
other international officials working on issues affecting Rwanda and the surrounding region of eastcentral Africa. This summary contains findings and observations in six thematic areas:
A
B
C
D
E
F

Demographics
Security Inside Rwanda
Repatriation and Resettlement
Internally Displaced Persons
Goma and Bukavu
Final Notes

These "Site Visit Notes" are written with an assumption that readers possess a basic
familiarity with Rwanda, its geography, and the events that have occurred there during 1994.

Purpose and Itinerary
Jeff Drumtra, Africa Policy Analyst for USCR, traveled to Rwanda and to neighboring
countries during the four-week period of October 20 to November 17, 1994.
The purpose ofUSCR's trip was to view the Rwanda situation in its full regional context-to examine the situation from the vantage point of Kigali, from the perspective of the hills and
communes of rural Rwanda, and from the perspective of refugee camps outside Rwanda's
borders. USCR attempted to gain a better understanding of the attitudes of uprooted Rwandans,
assess the humanitarian and security conditions in the refugee camps and the dynamics at work in
those camps, and examine the conditions for repatriation and resettlement of Rwandan refugees
and internally displaced Rwandans. USCR's four-week site visit was also an effort to better
understand the psychological impact on Rwandan society in the aftermath of genocide that killed
up to one million persons and a civil war that deposed one government and installed a significantly
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different one.
USCR's time in the region included parts of 12 days in Kigali, parts of seven days in rural
Rwanda, five days in the Goma region of Zaire, three days in the Bukavu region of Zaire, and
parts of five days in Burundi. Within Rwanda, USCR conducted site visits in six specific
locations, including Kigali, Gitarama, Gikongoro, Kaduha (Gikongoro area), Cyanika (Gikongoro
area), and the Bugesera region (southeast of Kigali). USCR also traveled overland within Rwanda
from Kigali to Gisenyi and from Cyangugu to Kigali via Butare, in order to gain impressions of
resettlement patterns and security conditions.
In the Goma region of Zaire, USCR conducted site visits to Kibumba, Mugunga, and
Katale refugee camps. In the Bukavu region of Zaire, USCR traveled to the refugee camps of
Kashusha, Inera, Hongo #1, and Hongo #2. In Burundi, USCR met with NGO and UNHCR
staff in Bujumbura and traveled to four sites in Muramvya province where internally displaced
Burundians have temporarily settled.

A • Demographics: Findings and Observations
1-A • Demographics of Rwanda prior to the genocide.
To provide a context for current-day Rwanda, it is helpful to keep in mind that Rwanda had
an estimated population of 7.5 million before this year's genocide, including a Tutsi population
living in Rwanda of 1 million to 1.5 million persons, according to various estimates. Rwanda's
population included an estimated 6 million to 6.5 million ethnic Hutu.
In addition, USCR estimated at the beginning of 1994 that some 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi
were living outside Rwanda as refugees or in refugee-like circumstances, although some Tutsi
sources estimated almost double that number of refugees.

2-A • The number of Rwandan refugees and internally displaced persons is probably 20
percent fewer than official estimates.
It appears that about 1. 7 million ethnic Hutu Rwandans are refugees outside the country,
somewhat fewer than UNHCR's official estimate of 2.1 million. Some relief organizations active
in the region, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), have estimated that the number of
Rwandan refugees is closer to 1.3 million--nearly 40 percent fewer than official estimates.
In addition, there is reason to believe that no more than 1.5 million Rwandans--mostly
Hutu--are internally displaced within Rwanda, somewhat fewer than the official UN estimate of
1.8 million.
These revised estimates suggest that a combined total of approximately 3.2 million
Rwandan Hutu are uprooted from their homes. Even this may be a substantial over-estL."tJlate.
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UNHCR and NGO personnel working in the region readily acknowledge that the official
refugee estimate of 2.1 million is inflated due to relief workers' inab~lity to conduct an official
census (leaders of the deposed regime have blocked census efforts 1n many camps), the
.
humanitarian desire to ensure that more than enough food is distributed, and occasional confus1on
in distinguishing between Rwandan refugees and Burundian refugees in some reporting.
Based on discussions with UN and NGO staff in Rwanda and in asylum countries, USCR
believes that 650,000 or fewer refugees are in the Goma region--nearly 25 percent fewer than the
850,000 cited in official estimates. Some 300,000 refugees are believed to be in the Bukavu
region--slightly fewer than the 320,000 official estimate. Some 60,000 Rwandan refugees are
located in Uvira (the balance of the 200,000 refugees in Uvira are Burundians, not Rwandans).
Some 160,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees are in Burundi--substantially fewer than the figure
of 210,000 cited in many reports. USCR was unable to conduct a site visit in Tanzania, but the
official estimate of some 500,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania appears to be a reasonably
accurate estimate, according to several sources.
UN workers in Rwanda indicated to USCR that their official estimate of 1.8 million
internally displaced persons is probably inflated by methodological flaws. The official UN
estimate was generated primarily by UNAMIR troops with no training in such surveys. Spotchecking by USCR in late October in Rwanda's sector 4A (the Gikongoro area) indicated that the
UN estimate there was inflated by about 25 percent. UNREO is attempting to revise its
methodology for measuring internal displacement and has sought funding from US AID for an
"air count" by satellite imagery.

3-A • Inflated estimates of the size of Rwanda's uprooted population have political
repercussions. Many international policymakers and donor governments appear to be
measuring the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Rwanda's new government based in part on
inflated estimates of the size of the uprooted population. International policymakers
dealing with Rwanda should guard against using inaccurate demographic information to
arrive at misguided policies.
In most emergencies, estimates of the number of refugees a,.t'}d internally displaced persons
are important primarily to gauge humanitarian assistance requirements. In Rwanda, however,
these estimates of population displacement have a powerful political dimension and for that
reason should be as accurate as possible.
Foreign governments are attaching enormous political weight to the size of the Rwandan
Hutu refugee population and to the number of Rwandan Hutu who are internally displaced. The
estimates appear to influence how the United States and other foreign officials view the new
government of Rwanda; the higher that the number of uprooted Rwandans is estimated to be, the
less legitimacy the new Rwandan government is judged to have in the eyes of many foreign
governments.
Leaders of Rwanda's deposed regime, as well as numerous U.S. and international officials,
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have argued that reports of nearly 4 million uprooted Rwandans indicates the new government's
lack of credibility and proves that Rwandan Hutu cannot live in present-day Rwanda. This
analysis appears to be one reason that the United States and most European nations have given
virtually no bilateral assistance to Rwanda's new government. In fact, massive numbers of
Rwandan Hutu clearly are uprooted, but the total number is probably closer to 3.2 million or
fewer, not the reported 3.9 million. This is a substantial difference that might begin to affect the
international community's political response to current-day Rwanda.
In another example, approximately 3 million Hutu may be living at home in Rwanda,
which suggests that large numbers ofHutu Rwandans have managed to settle and are attempting
to resume their normal lives. In fact, the number ofHutu settled in Rwanda appears to be nearly
equal to the number of Hutu who are refugees or internally displaced. An alarming number of
Hutu have been killed in Rwanda since July, but the statistics indicate that millions ofHutu have
not been targeted for reprisal killings in the country.
Too many Rwandans are uprooted, too much mistrust exists among Rwanda's various
population groups, and, for years to come, conflicts over land ownership and individuals'
complicity in the genocide will too frequently tum violent. The situation in Rwanda is sufficiently
grim; outsiders need not paint a worse picture by exaggerating facts in a way that provokes
misunderstandings and counterproductive policies by international powers.

4-A • Useful analytic tool: A "demographic snapshot" of Rwanda in late 1994 shows six
key population groups.
International attention has understandably focused on the large population of Rwandan
refugees. But the refugees are only one of six population groups who are greatly affecting currentday Rwanda.
The first population group includes the half-million to a million Tutsi who were killed in
the genocide--their absence is apparent and is an important element in the political and social
dynamics of current-day Rwanda.
The second population group is Tutsi who survived the massacres despite living in
Rwanda during the killings; these traumatized su..·rv·ivors might number as few as 100,000 or as
many as 500,000.
The third group includes an estimated 400,000 Tutsi exiles who have returned to
Rwanda since July after 30 years or more as refugees. No definitive census of these returnees
exists, and some ethnic Hutu Rwandans claim many more Tutsi exiles have settled in Rwanda
since July. The UN's estimate of 400,000 Tutsi returnees is the number most commonly cited,
however. Most Tutsi exiles are returning from neighboring Burundi and Uganda. Many
international observers predict that political and social tensions are likely between the Englishspeaking Tutsi returnees from Uganda and the French-speaking Tutsi returnees from Burundi.
The fourth group is comprised of the estimated 1.5 million, or fewer, internally displaced
Hutu within Rwanda.
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The fifth population group includes the approximately 1. 7 million Hutu refugees in Zaire,
Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda.
The sixth population group of Rwandans is comprised ofHutu who are living in their
homes in Rwanda--in other words, Hutu who are settled and are not uprooted. No census of
this group exists. It appears, extrapolating from the number ofHutu refugees and the nu~~er of
Hutu who are internally displaced, that 2.5 million to 3.5 million Rwandan Hutu may be hv1ng at
home.
Each of these six populations groups has its own needs, concerns, and motivations. Dead
victims of the genocide require justice. Traumatized survivors require special services and
confidence of safety. Tutsi returnees require land to restart their lives. Uprooted Hutu require
accurate information, freedom of choice, and security. Hutu settled at home in Rwanda need
continued safety and a resumption of development programs in their home areas.

B • Security Inside Rwanda: Findings and Observations
5-B • Security incidents do occur almost daily in Rwanda. It is an exaggeration, however,
to portray the country as being awash in violence. Many areas appear to be generally
peaceful for sustained periods. The Butare area appears to be an area of particular
concern.
Mysterious killings happen nearly every day somewhere in Rwanda. These cannot be
condoned or ignored, but they are not surprising in the aftermath of genocide and in the absence of
a strong government or a functioning justice system.
During USCR's site visit to Rwanda, several large security incidents each claimed the lives
of five to 35 persons near Gisenyi and Kibuye. One parish priest near Gitarama told USCR that
216 persons had been murdered in his parish area during the preceding three months, among an
estimated parish area population of about 50,000. The priest confided that, in his opinion, "many
of those who deserved to be killed have been killed"--an interesting comment by a priest. He said
that murders in the parish had decreased significantly in October.
Large numbers of long-time Tutsi exiles have returned to the Butare area, and a
disproportionate number of killings and other violent acts appeared to be occurring there during
USCR's site visit to Rwanda. No exact crime statistics are available. USCR heard numerous
accounts of Hutu civilians who attempted to return home to the Butare region but were compelled
to flee again because of threats to their safety. During early November, unconfrrmed rumors
circulated that some local government officials in Butare, apparently acting on their own initiative
and contrary to the official policy of Rwanda's national authorities, were not cooperating with plans
to return large numbers ofHutu displaced persons to the region.
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6-B • Killings are occurring in Rwanda for numerous reasons and with a mixture of
motives. Human rights experts and other international observers should not jump to
quick assumptions about the purpose and perpetrators of a particular murder, or about
how killings can be stopped.
Foreign policymakers viewing Rwanda from a distance tend to assume that all killings
there occur for purposes of revenge, and that the only question is whether the killings are a matter
of policy by the government or RP A. These quick assumptions over-simplify the dynamics at
work in Rwanda and underestimate the difficulty of curbing violence. There are many motives for
killing besides revenge, and many suspects beyond RPA soldiers.
USCR identified at least seven reasons why killings are being committed in Rwanda by
different sets of culprits:
• some Tutsi civilians commit murders as personal revenge for the death of their families;
• individual RP A soldiers commit murders as personal retribution for the genocide;
• groups of RPA soldiers under pay from Tutsi civilians act as hired assassins against specific
individuals;
• some Tutsi civilians kill to gain land ownership;
• Interahamwe militia operating in Rwanda kill fellow-Hutu to discourage repatriation, intimidate
returnees, and cast international suspicion on the new Rwandan government;
• some Hutu civilians have allegedly committed murders to eliminate Hutu eyewitnesses to the
genocide of April-May;
• banditry may be a source of some killings, particularly in the absence of a strong central
government or a local police force.
This brief listing of motives suggests that no single, easy panacea can bring full security
inside Rwanda. Putting international pressure on the central government to discipline the RP A is a
partial remedy but will not stop all killings. It is reasonable to expect that the establishment of a
functioning justice system in the country could curb some--but not all--killings by raising
expectations among Rwandans that a state legal system will reliably punish Hutu murderers of
April-May as well as Tutsi killers since July. The existence of a justice system, however, is
unlikely to curb ongoing killings by Interahamwe or by individuals who are determined to
eliminate witnesses to their participation in last April's mass murders.

No single tactic can stop violence in Rwanda, but a combination of strategies can
help. The international community should continue to press the new government for improved
domestic security and adherence to human rights. The new government requires bilateral financial
assistance from the U.S. and other major donors in order to implement and enforce its avowed
policies of reconciliation and justice. Placing RPA soldiers on salary might facilitate military
discipline and lessen individual soldiers' incentive to operate as vigilante killers-for-hire. The UN
human rights monitoring program in Rwanda should expand operations rapidly to every
commune in the country and should receive the resources needed to sustain itself for a year or
more. Murders perpetrated inside Rwanda by representatives of the former regime will not be
curtailed unless the international community moves more aggressively to detain leaders of the
former regime and crack down on Interahamwe operating in Rwanda and along its borders.
This mixture of strategies can begin to help stabilize security in Rwanda, but the results are
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likely to be gradual. Policymakers, NGOs, and others must be tough-minded and cannot expect
instant social reconciliation. In the aftermath of genocide, civil war, the overthrow of a
government, an administratively weak new government,.persis~ent land ~ressure~, and ~ears of
hate-filled propaganda by the old regime, a sustained penod of. Isolated y1~lence, ms~cunty, and
mistrust are virtually inevitable in current-day Rwanda. Even 1f the maJonty of Tuts1 and Hutu
have good intentions, it is to be expected that things will be amiss for a long time to come.

7-B • The discipline of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) has deteriorated since July.
The vaunted discipline of the RPA has eroded, perhaps due in part to an expansion of the
army in order to patrol the entire country after the RPA's military victory in July. Many new
recruits reportedly have minimal training. Veteran RPA soldiers, flush with victory, are agitating
for salaries after operating four years in the bush as an unpaid rebel force.
USCR's policy analyst, traveling alone and with other NGO personnel throughout Rwanda
in October and early November, encountered no harassment, threats, or inconveniences by the
many RP A soldiers encountered. RP A roadblocks were actually fewer and more casual than
USCR expected. However, numerous incidents occurred during USCR's site visit--including
murders of Rwandans, harassment of UNAMIR troops, and robberies of NGO compounds--in
which witnesses reportedly implicated uniformed or partially uniformed RPA soldiers. Some
civilian government officials acknowledged to USCR that "the RPA is not what it used to be."

8-B • More Interahamwe live and function inside Rwanda than many outsiders realize.
Interahamwe are particularly active in camps for internally displaced persons in southwest
Rwanda.
NGO workers interviewed by USCR were convinced that Interahamwe are present in the
internally displaced camps in the Gikongoro area and that they are becoming stronger and more
active there. One relief worker told USCR that several thousand internally displaced persons in
one area had registered to return to their homes by bus during a recent week, but that only about 20
persons actually returned home because Interahamwe effectively blocked or intimidated the
overwhelming majority from leaving.
A recent UNREO report on camps for internally displaced persons in southwest Rwanda
leaves no doubt about Interahamwe activity. The report noted that "Interahamwe [are] openly
active" in one camp, that "former RGF [former Rwandan government forces] are mounting
criminal attacks from a base nearby" another camp, that "former RGF have been carrying out
criminal acts" in a third camp, and that former leaders at a fourth camp "threatened displaced
persons who expressed any wishes to leave the camp.''
The continued presence of Interahamwe inside Rwanda has important implications. It
means, for example, that many international policymakers misunderstand the multiple sources of
violence in Rwanda. The conventional wisdom abroad tends to assume that all Interahamwe and
other guilty I?ersons fie~ ~wanda after the RPA military victory, and that all Hutu remaining inside
Rwanda are Innocent c1v1hans. Not so. The continued Interahamwe presence inside Rwanda
7

contributes to violence and general insecurity that is beyond the new government's ability to
control. Furthermore, the presence of Interahamwe in Rwanda means that many of the estimated
1 million internally displaced Hutu in southwest Rwanda cannot freely choose when to return
home. Some displaced Hutu in Rwanda may be virtual hostages to the Interaha1nwe, in the same
way that many Hutu refugees in Goma are virtual hostages.
The growing Interahamwe presence in the camps in western Rwanda has created security
concerns within the new government and has occasionally provoked an overly aggressive
response by the RP A, which raided and burned several camps in early November. The
international community rightfully condemned the manner of the burnings and the forced
movement of the camps' residents. The episode, however, illustrates the complicated international
expectations placed on the new government: it is under pressure to restore internal security
expeditiously, but not in an overly aggressive fashion; the existence of internally displaced persons
camps is cited as an indictment of the government's legitimacy, but heavy-handed government
efforts to close some camps have drawn criticism.

9-B • Security inside Rwanda cannot improve--and may significantly deteriorate--until the
new Rwandan government receives the bilateral aid and resources it needs to function and
attempt to maintain order. The power vacuum created by a virtually non-functioning
central government in Kigali is having negative consequences in the countryside.
The United States and most other major donor nations have conspicuously withheld
bilateral aid from the new Rwandan government, which has virtually no financial resources of its
own. The court system does not yet function, a trained police force does not exist, and most
government officials, civil servants, and RPA soldiers work with little or no pay. Virtually all
government personnel are new to their jobs and have limited expertise and experience in
government administration. Basic supplies and equipment are scarce. The net result of donors'
short-sightedness is that the Rwandan government has only a limited capacity to implement
policies of reconstruction, resettlement, justice, and national reconciliation.
The existence of a crippled government in Kigali encourages local officials to take matters
into their own hands and pursue personal agendas. The resulting deterioration of government
discipline and accountability is dangerous. Many local officials appear to be less moderate than
national officials in Kigali.
One prime example, which occurred during USCR's site visit to the region, was the forced
closure and destruction of several camps for internally displaced persons near Kibuye in late
October. The incident was one signal that the national government, handicapped by its lack of
resources, is sometimes helpless to enforce its own clearly stated policies on local officials. Prior
to and immediately after the incident at the camps, national officials in Kigali publicly stated that
forcible resettlement of uprooted Hutu is contrary to government policy. Sources told USCR
that local Kibuye officials who supported forced closure of the camps acted without permission, in
direct violation of the national government's policy. UNREO reported on October 26 and October
28 that "the government has said that there is no policy to forcibly remove IDPs from IDP
camps." After forcible removals occurred, UNREO reported on November 7 that "the
government has reiterated that there is no government policy to forcibly remove IDPs from the
8

camps."

10-B • The UN human rights monitoring program for Rwanda is developing too slowly.
At current rates of deployment, the program may not reach its mandated full strength of
147 monitors until March 1995.
The monitoring program is an important component in establishing conditions conducive
to repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced Rwandans. The program will
provide a sustained, trained international presence throughout the country to monitor current
human rights conditions.
Despite its widely recognized importance, the program is operating at less than half-speed
due to insufficient financing by international donors, inadequate equipment, and uncreative
administration by UN human rights staff. USCR found that approximately 40 UN human rights
observers had arrived in Rwanda by early November, fewer than 20 of whom were actually
deployed in the field outside of Kigali. The head of the monitoring operation in Kigali, William
Clarence, told USCR that he expected to have about 70 or 80 monitors in-country by the end of
December. The full contingent of 147 might not arrive until March or April1995.
Clarence told USCR that the monitoring operation lacked vehicles, radios, reliable
translators, and needed more administrative support in Kigali to coordinate the program's
expansion. The program has virtually exhausted its limited first allotment of funds. The U.S.
pledged a modest $750,000 to the program months ago but reportedly had not paid the money as
of late November. In any event, $750,000 from the United States is paltry support for an
estimated $10 million operation that can bolster security, justice, and accountability in a country
where up to one million persons have been slaughtered and millions of others are waiting to return
home safely.

C • Repatriation and Resettlement: Findings and Observations
11-C • The pattern oi resettiement within Rwanda is spotty. Some areas are virtually
empty, some locations have 90 percent resettlement, many areas appear to be half full.
It is difficult to generalize about settlement patterns in Rwanda. Some communes and hills
appear to be well-settled, whereas locations three miles down the same road are eerily
underpopulated. Parts of extreme southwest Rwanda (between Cyangugu and Nyungwe forest)
and southeast Rwanda appear to be virtually empty for long stretches, though some people can be
found. Patterns of permanent settlement are often difficult to ascertain because farm land in some
areas is being cultivated by displaced persons rather than by the actual owners, who are dead or
absent. Hutu individuals and families engaged in daily activities were readily identifiable along the
many highways traveled by USCR. Daily UNHCR bus convoys carry Tutsi exiles into Rwanda
to settle.
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Several NGO workers told USCR they believe that Kigali has regained its previous
population level, albeit with a significantly different mix of people. In the opinion of USCR,
however, based on unscientific observations, Kigali remains less populated than it was previously,
with perhaps one-third fewer people now.

12-C • The next opportune moment for repatriation is during the January planting
season, but repatriation at that time will probably remain relatively small.
Many relief workers in Rwanda were surprised when relatively few Hutu refugees
repatriated in time for the September-October planting season. Those relief workers now say they
were naive to expect large repatriation so soon after the trauma of a few months earlier. The
January planting season may act as a magnet to draw some refugees and internally displaced Hutu
to their homes, but fear about conditions in Rwanda and intimidation in the camps will probably
keep repatriation relatively smalL As a result, another planting season will have been missed, and
food dependency will be prolonged.

13-C • It is important to understand the many reasons why Hutu refugees and internally
displaced persons are not returning home.
Too many international observers and policymakers see only part of the picture in Rwanda.
Many foreign officials mistakenly believe that reprisals against Hutu must be the singular reason
why refugees and internally displaced Hutu are not returning home. Similarly, many relief
workers are tempted to believe that most uprooted Hutu would rapidly go home if the
Interahamwe were dismantled. In fact, the attitudes among uprooted Rwandan Hutu are more
complicated.
USCR's site visit to the region indicates that there are at least ten reasons why people are
staying in camps and are not returning home:
• some refuse to go home because they are guilty of murder and fear being brought to justice; it is
important to remember that those who are guilty are not considered to be refugees under
international law, and do not deserve refugee protection or support;
• some Hutu hesitate to go home because they are sincerely unsure of their own culpability; some
may feel morally guilty although legally they are innocent; others believe themselves innocent but
fear that Tutsi or the UN might judge them to be guilty.
• some do not go home because they are aware of real security incidents in which Hutu have
recently died in Rwanda;
• some are afraid to go home because systematic rumor, misinformation, and propaganda by the
deposed regime in the camps have created false accounts about killings and have instilled an
exaggerated fear of security conditions inside Rwanda among uprooted Hutu;
• some Hutu have been physically prevented from returning home by Interaharnwe in the
camps; they have seen fellow-refugees murdered in the camps because they planned to repatriate;
they have been told by camp leaders that Interahamwe will hunt them and kill them at their homes
if they return home without permission;
• some Hutu do not repatriate because, by cultural tradition, they feel compelled to loyally
10

support and follow their leaders, right or wrong;
.
.
• some do not return home because their homes are now occupied by Tuts1;
• others do not return because their homes have been destroyed;
• escalating violence in neighboring Burundi may influence some Rwandan Hutu refugees to
stay in camps; reports of killings and other violence in Burundi compound the general sense of
insecurity and uncertainty felt by many Rwandan Hutu;
• some Rwandan Hutu do not go home because they are physically or emotionally exhausted,
infirm, traumatized, and they need rest; some have been uprooted for nearly two years because of
Rwanda's civil war; for some farmers, the nutrition and health conditions in the camps may be
equivalent to their normal impoverished lives in Rwanda.
This list of ten motives carries policy implications. It suggests that no single policy or
program will, by itself, open wide the flow of repatriation. A comprehensive strategy is required
inside Rwanda and in refugee camps. International policymakers should also note that the
government of Rwanda has direct control only over three of the ten factors impeding repatriation
(clarifying culpability, addressing security incidents, and returning homes to rightful owners). The
majority of factors blocking repatriation and resettlement can only be addressed by the
international community.
The new government of Rwanda should take several steps. First, the new government
could help ease individual Hutu's uncertainty about their own culpability by assembling and
publishing a list of individuals being sought for crimes of murder and genocide. Whether the list
contains 10,000 or 30,000 or 50,000 names is, at this point, unimportant. What is important is
that the list be published so that the huge number of innocent Hutu refugees will know that they
are considered innocent and can return without fear of prosecution. Although a list of
suspected culprits would probably contain many names of innocent people and would probably
lack the names of some guilty people, these flaws are correctable in the long-term. Such a list
would immediately be a significant step toward accountability, reconciliation, and repatriation. The
new government would require international funding and other resources to assemble the list
quickly.
Secondly, the new government, with the necessary international financial support, should
address ongoing security incidents in the country by acting forcefully and publicly to punish
vigilante reprisals, banditry, and other human rights abuses. Thirdly, the new government requires
thP. nP.r>P.~~'A-ru intP-rnatirn~'Al <::lccict<:~-n£',::. tr.. ~-n ... r,::.-ntr.·ru nlll.-. .... rlla+'+ ... '"'"'" ...... + 1... ... , +1...~ ~~-~~~...l~ ,.-.-...l -~---~...l
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for the relocation of Tutsi returnees who are currently residing on land owned by Hutu refugees.
To repeat: these three steps, none of them simple even for a strong government, much less
a new one, can only be undertaken if the U.S. and other international donors become actively
engaged in working with the government of Rwanda. The international community has thus far
resisted taking this step.
Even if, miraculously, the new government immediately achieved all three steps suggested
above, it is important to understand that significant other factors would continue to impede
repatriation. The new government can do nothing, for example, to stop the destructive
propaganda of the deposed regime, nor can it neutralize the intimidation practiced by the
Interahamwe in refugee camps outside the country, nor can it control troubling events in Burundi,
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nor is it in a position to offer to rebuild destroyed homes or induce Hutu farmers to return with
promises of an easier life.

14-C • The majority of the ten factors impeding repatriation and resettlement can only be
addressed by the international community.
The international tribunal must move quickly to arrest guilty leaders of the old regime and
bring them to justice. Only the international community can break the control of the Interahamwe
and the former military in the refugee camps. Only international donors and development
agencies can help to repair homes and conduct programs that might improve the quality of life in
Rwanda and encourage uprooted Hutu to resettle. Only the international community can provide
the international presence that will give Hutu and Tutsi confidence to live again in a multi-ethnic
Rwanda.

15-C • Rwanda is caught in a political trap created by the policies of the international
community, including the United States. The new government has been signaled that it
must induce millions of Hutu refugees and internally displaced persons to return home so
as to boost the new government's political credibility among international donors. Yet the
new government, deprived of bilateral aid, has virtually no administrative capacity to create
conditions for repatriation or to cope with the tensions and disputes certain to occur when
millions of uprooted Hutu return home.
The "wait-and-see" policy of the United States and other major countries toward the new
government is paving the way toward guaranteed social chaos and renewed violence. U.S. policy
makers insist that the new government must provide better security for the Hutu population and
for potential returnees, yet U.S. policy deliberately deprives the Rwandan government of resources
to function. As a result, the new government cannot gain or demonstrate the credibility it is
accused of lacking.

16-C • The government of Rwanda says that its land ownership policy protects the
ownership rights of Hutu citizens who have fled. This policy is supposedly favored by the
international community, but the government has been deprived of the international
support it will need to implement the policy.
Officials of the new government say that Hutu landholders retain ownership of their
property and that long-time Tutsi exiles returning to Rwanda cannot, as a general rule, regain
possession of land they previously owned. The large majority of Tutsi exiles who have returned
to Rwanda have been allowed to settle on plots of land on a temporary basis, the government says.
Rwandan Hutu who have fled retain legal rights to the property left behind and can gain
possession upon their return home, according to government policy.
This is the correct policy. If properly implemented, it can reduce disputes over land
ownership and could encourage Hutu refugees to repatriate. The problem is that the international
community has, so far, failed to give the government the support needed to implement the policy
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properly. Arbitration panels, land use studies, and relocation services will be necessary to resettle
Tutsi returnees permanently.

D • Internally Displaced Persons: Findings and Observations
17-D. Rwanda's internally displaced population is almost certainly smaller than official
estimates. UNREO lists some 80 sites for internally displaced persons throughout the
country. Most sites, however, are food drop-off points rather than camps. Encampments
for the internally displaced population primarily exist in the southwest.
The internally displaced population is 1.5 million or fewer (see item 2-A).

18-D • Internally displaced persons in camps in southwest Rwanda include a

disproportionate number of old, young, and infirm who were apparently too weak to make
the six-day trek to Zaire in August.
This is a potentially significant finding. It suggests that some residents may be unable to
return home because of physical limitations, regardless of any improvements that may occur in
security conditions.

19-D • As many as two-thirds of the internally displaced persons in some camps in
southwest Rwanda are more than 30 kilometers from their normal homes. Therefore many
of them may not necessarily possess timely, accurate information about security conditions
in their home areas.
This is a potentially significant and unexpected finding. Since a large portion of the
internally displaced persons in the camps are farther from their homes than commonly realized,
they may not have first-hand information about the conditions for return. This makes them
potentially susceptible to misinformation in the same way that refugees outside the country are,
particularly if Interaharnwe are present in the displaced camps.
In some cases it might be a mistake for UNHCR to view the internally displaced
population as a barometer of insecurity in the country. According to UNHCR officials, refugees
outside Rwanda cannot safely repatriate until the displaced population inside the country
demonstrates that conditions are safe by returning home. UNHCR officials believe that most
internally displaced persons are close to their home areas--within a few kilometers--and therefore
possess reliable, first-hand knowledge of safety conditions. This is not always the case, however.
Internally displaced Hutu in the camps of southwest Rwanda may not always be a reliable
indicator of true security conditions in the countryside.
Security concerns are one reason uprooted Hutu do not go home, but it is not the only
reason. (See item 13-C for a discussion of additional reasons.)
13

20-D • Health conditions in most camps for internally displaced persons in the Gikongoro
area have improved dramatically since September. Security conditions, however, have
deteriorated. Interahamwe are present and increasingly active.
Mortality rates in most camps have declined to two or three deaths per day per 10,000
residents, one-third the death rate experienced in the same camps in August and September. Most
camps receive NGO medical services and food relief. MSF reported 20 percent global
malnutrition rates in some camps examined by USCR.
Some relief organizations were privately considering withdrawing from the most
problematic camps south of Gikongoro, near the Burundi border, because of deteriorating security
or, in some cases, because of a sense that the camps are unnecessary. (See item 8-B for
information about Interahamwe in the camps inside Rwanda.)

21-D • NGOs should work closely with the new government to gradually phase out many
of the camps in southwest Rwanda in a coordinated manner.
Officials of the new government say that they are eager to close the camps for internally
displaced persons in an orderly manner. Several NGOs indicated to USCR that they would
concur with such a plan, linked with a gradual reduction in food rations to the camps and larger
food distributions to potential home settlement areas. Improved communication and coordination
between relief organizations and government officials are needed to begin this sensitive strategy.

E • Goma and Bukavu: Findings and Observations
22-E • The humanitarian emergency is stabilized. Relief organizations have done their
humanitarian jobs well.
The refugee can1ps, particularly in Goma, remain crowded, miserable places. Massive
deaths due to cholera and dysentery no longer occur, however. UNHCR and NGOs have
generally managed to coordinate their relief operations. Camp hospitals and clinics are prevalent,
NGO sanitation teams patrol the Goma camps, and solid waste disposal is relatively under control.
Water systems are in place and are expanding. Water is trucked to Goma's Kibumba camp at a
cost of $1 million per month.

Mortality rates appeared to be impressively low, although inadequate census data make
accurate mortality measurements impossible. Reports of official mortality rates of less than one
death per day per 10,000 persons in Bukavu are "probably too good to be true," UNHCR
acknowledges. Although dysentery deaths have declined, dysentery remains the most serious
health threat in Goma. Malaria and pneumonia are growing health problems in the current rainy
season. Meningitis is also a concern.
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Malnutrition among refugees in both B ukavu and Goma is reportedly less than 10
percent, although malnutrition may be increasing in the GoT?~ camps, according to some reports.
Relief workers continue to express concern that health conditions are worse among female-headed
families and other vulnerable groups, due to the deposed regime's continued control over most
food distribution. Any food shortages that occur in the Zaire camps appear to be caused by
improper or dishonest food distribution by camp leaders, rather than due to a real shortage of food.
UNHCR reports that it expended $115 million in the Goma camps alone during July
through October. The International Rescue Committee's (IRC) relief operation in Goma's
Kibumba camp is the agency's largest in the world.
23-E • The deposed regime continues to control the largest refugee camps in a brazen,

highly capable manner. The deposed regime and its Interahamwe enforcers block refugees
physically and psychologically from repatriating.
The deposed regime's physical and psychological control of the camps was evident during
USCR's site visit. During USCR's time in Goma, at least four refugees--perhaps more--were
clubbed to death one mid-afternoon near an NGO compound for allegedly trying to obtain accurate
information about conditions in Rwanda and the potential to repatriate. Relief workers told USCR
it was the most flagrant incident of deadly violence they had witnessed. The incident indicated the
brazen control and intimidation imposed by camp leaders on a daily basis. Relief workers told
USCR that murders occur several times per week in the Goma camps and that many incidents go
unreported. UNHCR protection officers are usually unable to intervene.
In addition to physical intimidation, the regime conducts "psychological warfare" in the
refugee camps with an effective, systematic misinformation and propaganda campaign that
exaggerates the dangers facing Hutu inside Rwanda, accentuates ethnic hatred, and has convinced
many refugees that the war must continue. Refugees interviewed by USCR insisted that "the
war is not finished." The refugees have been told repeatedly by their leaders that virtually no Hutu
are able to live in Rwanda and that Rwandan Hutu have been the victims of a genocidal campaign
by ~he RP A in which 2 million Hutu have allegedly been slaughtered, according to the deposed
regime.
USCR visited Mugungu refugee camp near Goma, which contains thousands of former
Rwandan soldiers in uniform. The camp stretches 20 kilometers (12 miles) along the road. The
greater security threat in the camps, however, are the Interahamwe, who are more integrated into
the camp population than are the soldiers.

24-E • Camps in Goma remain dangerous for international relief workers.
Based on our site visit, USCR believes that it is probably only a matter of time before one
or more international relief workers are assassinated in the Goma camps. Previous NGO attempts
to reform the food distribution system and undermine the control of the deposed regime have been
met with death threats and intimidation.
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f!Relief workers are powerless to break the regime's control over the camps," several
NGOs said in a joint statement on November 3, during USCR's site visit to Goma. UNHCR
reported in October that "the lives of relief workers have been threatened repeatedly." A relief
worker reported to USCR that Interahamwe threatened to kill his local workers unless he hired
Interahamwe members. Relief workers widely believe that the former Rwandan military breach
NGO security by monitoring NGO radio traffic.

25-E • Relief organizations should engage in robust debate about the ethics of operating in
the refugee camps.
Relief organizations in Goma were in the process of debating whether they should threaten
to withdraw from Goma for ethical and security reasons during USCR's site visit to Goma in early
November. Fifteen NGOs issued a joint announcement on November 3 threatening to withdraw
their support from the Goma camps. The NGOs said that the refugees are "hostages" in the
camps. Given the pervasive military and Interahamwe presence in the camps, some relief workers
had come to believe that their own efforts were, at worst, providing a catering service to military
bases. They were concerned that humanitarian relief is inadvertently strengthening a genocidal
regime bent on continued warfare.
USCR witnessed several NGO discussions in Goma on this issue and was impressed with
the rigor of debate among relief workers and the care with which they crafted their public
statement. Numerous NGOs operating in Goma disagreed with the notion of withdrawal and
refused to sign the joint statement. They argued that a large-scale NGO withdrawal of assistance
would seriously harm hundreds of thousands of innocent refugees.
USCR believes the decision to stay or withdraw from the camps is a matter that each NGO
should decide separately. What is important is that each NGO operating in the camps should
engage in rigorous debate at the field level and at the headquarters level. In Goma, humanitarian
relief has political and human rights repercussions that responsible NGOs should not ignore.
Given the realities of the refugee camps in Goma, NGOs cannot easily claim that their relief
programs there are nonpolitical.

26-E • Zaire military and police are a large part of the security problem. They cannot and
should not be trusted to provide reliable security for refugees and relief workers.
Zaire's security forces are historically corrupt, undisciplined, and poorly trained. Zairean
police and military in Goma and Bukavu routinely extort money from relief agencies, physically
harass relief workers, and generally pose a security problem rather than a security solution.
Relief workers in Bukavu confided to USCR that Zairean police and soldiers pose an even
more serious threat to NGOs' security than does the Interahamwe. UNHCR's chief protection
officer in Bukavu, traveling in a clearly marked UNHCR vehicle, was robbed by Zairean police
during USCR's site visit. Police in Goma routinely confiscate NGO vehicles. Relief groups. in
Goma believe that Zairean police and military monitor NGO radio traffic for unauthorized
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purposes.
Any policies by the U.S. or UN that primarily rely ~n s~stained, constructive help from
Zaire's security forces are likely to fail and may make the s1tuat1on wors~. Crackdowns 1n early
December by Zairean soldiers against some refugee leaders produced rmxed results.

27-E What to do about Gorna: four scenarios are possible.
Option 1--The Status Quo
The international community might continue its current policy of massive aid to the refugee
camps and to the former regime, in hopes that refugees will trickle back home at current rates of
500-1,000 per day and that the former regime will gradually lose control of the refugees. Under
this scenario, perhaps most refugees might return by the end of 1996, with only hardcore
extremists, murderers, and their families remaining in Zaire. The scenario would presumably give
Rwandan society and the country's new government extended breathing space to gain strength
and capacity to absorb returnees.
Option 1 would require an expensive, extended relief effort. UNHCR alone spent $115
million in Goma in a three-month period. There is uncertainty whether donor nations will
continue to pledge adequate funding. In addition, this scenario ignores the deposed regime's savvy
tenacity in preventing large refugee repatriation. The regime's leaders would likely revert to more
aggressive measures to block refugees' movements if the regime senses its support base is
eroding. Policy makers should not underestimate the regime's power to hold refugees physically
and psychologically.
The longer that refugees remain outside Rwanda and under the sway of the old regime's
propaganda, the stronger their sense of victimization will become, and the more complicated the
land ownership issue will become inside Rwanda. The status quo may be unsustainable and
may fail to avoid a humanitarian emergency if numerous NGOs fulfill their threat to leave or
donors withdraw support from the camps.

Option 2--Massive Armed UN Intervention
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has proposed sending up to 12,000 heavily armed
troops into Goma cfu~ps with an aggressive mandate to disaim t.1.e estimated 20,000 fonner
Rwandan soldiers and neutralize the Interahamwe. This action would address far more than the
refugee problem: it would remove a military and political force that is deadly, radical, and is
threatening to destabilize Rwanda and the entire region for years or decades to come. It is an
ambitious, far-reaching option that would seek to eliminate the most blatantly genocidal regime the
world has seen in 50 years.

U~~

Option 2 is probably politically unrealistic. The U.S. and other major donors appear to
have no appetite for financing such a UN mission at this time, and other countries appear unlikely
to volunteer troops for a clearly dangerous assignment. Any disarmament effort would probably
require a mini-war for several weeks or months against a desperate regime that has already
proven its willingness to employ brutally extreme tactics to survive. The operation would
probably be bloody for all concerned, including the UN, the deposed regime, the refugees, and
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NGOs. The operation would probably interrupt relief activities for a minimum of several weeks.
Some relief workers question whether Option 2 would manage to break the control of the
Interahamwe, who do not wear military uniforms and would not be easily identifiable by an
outside military force.
Option 3--UN Police and Escorts
The UN might deploy some 4,000 UN troops in the Goma camps to act as a police force
and to escort refugee families out of the camps when they want to repatriate. This force would be
smaller and more passive than the UN force in Option 2. This force would not attempt to disarm
the former Rwandan military. The purpose would be to make repatriation physically possible on a
day-by-day basis when families decide they are ready to return to Rwanda.
Option 3 is criticized as politically unrealistic, for the same financial and safety reasons as
Option 2. Doubt exists whether a UN force, if assembled, would possess adequate training to
perform this policing function well. Presumably African troops would compose most or all of the
force. It should be expected that the deposed regime's military and Interahamwe militia would
militarily challenge this force, particularly if it proved to be effective at facilitating repatriation.
Option 4--Pullout by NGOs
Numerous NGOs might withdraw their services from the camps for reasons of ethics or
security during the first half of 1995. Many would probably shift their humanitarian operations
into Rwanda, thereby acting as a magnet to attract repatriation. Some NGOs would attempt to
link their pullout from Goma with the establishment of safe havens in western Rwanda to be
protected by UNAMIR troops. Such a strategy would also assuage ethical concerns about
stopping services to large numbers of dependent refugees in Goma. This strategy would be
messy, but it might help force the first step toward national reconciliation by getting virtually all
Rwandans back in their country.
Option 4 might cause innocent refugees to suffer or die when aid becomes unavailable in
the camps. The strategy, in its early stages, would merely shift the uprooted population from the
Zaire side of the border to the Rwanda side, where they would probably remain uprooted and in
need of assistance due to initial hesitancies about returning all the way to their homes. Option 4
would likely create bottlenecks of large numbers of internally displaced Hutu in western Rwanda
that could lead to new humanitarian emergencies.
In addition, Option 4 might not solve security problems, since Interahamwe and former
soldiers out of uniform would probably accompany the refugees into new camps in Rwanda.
Remember that current displaced camps in Rwanda already have Interahamwe and security
problems despite the presence of UNAMIR and RP A soldiers. New camps in Rwanda might
merely become new bases for the former regime's insurgency, with the added advantage to the
old regime that the new bases are inside "enemy territory."
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F • Final Notes
28-F • Rwanda is one of the largest refugee situations in the world. But Rwanda is much
more than strictly a refugee crisis.
Rwanda will never be the same again. In the aftermath of genocide that systematically
murdered up to 1 million persons, as well as a four-year civil war, a pervasive psychology of fear,
paranoia, and lingering hatred may require generations to resolve in favor of true reconciliation.
Nearly two-thirds of the country's population have been killed or uprooted--an upheaval from
which no country or society can quickly recover. A genocidal force of some 20,000 soldiers and
some 60,000 militia, by some estimates, remain poised on Rwanda's borders and in some pockets
of the country itself, intent on continuing the killing and threatening to destabilize the region of eastcentral Africa for years to come.
Viewed in its full context, Rwanda is far more than one of the largest, most complex
refugee crises in the world. The difficult and dangerous task before the world at the moment is
getting Rwandan refugees home voluntarily. Even if all refugees repatriated tomorrow, however,
it is sobering to realize that many of the demons afflicting Rwandan society remain. The last time
the world witnessed such a clear-cut case of genocide was 50 years ago in Nazi Germany, and the
surviving victims were given their own nation in which to rebuild their community and their lives.
That is not an option under discussion in the aftermath of Rwanda's genocide.
The new government of Rwanda insists that it is committed to a multi-ethnic, multiparty
state. But even if it pursues the wisest of policies and the best of intentions, reconciliation will be
neither easy, nor smooth, nor quick. Such is the legacy of genocide.
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